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Articles

Information and Antitrust
FrankH. Easterbrookt

The function of a keynote address is to present both an overview and an agenda for the conference to come. I think that I can
do both in short compass.
Antitrust law is an interesting regulatory project only when
it has clear targets; otherwise it becomes random interference
with competition and undermines its stated goals. Thus the central question of antitrust: When do business practices, including
agreements among producers, become economic problems? Only
when the parties can prevent competition from springing up. Cartels have trouble with cheaters and fringe firms. Mergers, even
mergers to monopoly, are undermined by new entry that is
prompted by higher prices. Exclusionary practices fail when rivals are resilient and can roll with the punches, returning to their
business after the exclusion has exhausted the predator (which
must incur steep expenses itself to raise rivals' costs).
When productive assets are immobile, easily monitored, and
take a long time to build or replace, then producers have some
hope of success in raising consumers' prices. Think of oil refineries, which are visible and take years to construct. Agreement to
stop building refineries, even as demand for refined oil grows,
would yield an effective and easily monitored cartel. But the
t Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit; Senior Lecturer,
University of Chicago. This essay was presented as the keynote address at the Symposium
"Antitrust in the Information Age" at the University of Chicago on October 29, 1999, and
has been revised slightly for publication. It is © 1999-2000 by Frank H. Easterbrook.
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characteristic of an "information age" is that both the valuable
productive input and the output for consumers is knowledge. Information can be created in secret and move around the globe
instantly. It can be used without being used up, so that any new
sale exceeds the producer's marginal cost. These properties make
information highly resistant to the standard devices that worry
antitrust enforcers, for they are incompatible with the delay and
other barriers to entry that protect monopoly profits. The rate of
new entry in the information business is high and increasing.
These days it seems that you can sell stock of your new firm even
before deciding what it will make or do. Prices are everywhere
falling. This is not good ground for a cartel.
Some years back William Baumol and two collaborators formally proved that even a single-firm market will behave as if perfectly competitive, provided that there is a threat of instantaneous entry. A single hit-and-run entrant moving from place to
place could force prices down to marginal cost all over the world.'
Baumol's critics replied that this may be true in theory, but what
significance has it in practice? Even highly mobile assets such as
airplanes require ground support, and there may be scarcities
such as landing rights at hubs. Some of these scarcities are created and enforced by the government, defeating free entry and
allowing cartels, mergers, and exclusionary practices to do their
work. That's true of physical assets, in most cases, but not of information. In an information age the economy is becoming closer
to free and quick responses to any elevation in price. The closer it
gets, the less important the rule of law. Ronald Coase showed
that when transactions are costless, the rule of law does not matter.' Will Baumol proved the antitrust subset of that proposition:
when the particular transaction of entry is costless, the rule of
antitrust law does not matter.
Of course transactions are never costless; there is enough
friction in the economy to support law, and thus law schools.
Likewise there is enough friction in the economy to support some
monopolizing behavior.' But as we move from physical to knowledge goods the friction declines, and the period of adjustment
needed to overcome some monopolistic move likewise declines.
Fewer governmental barriers to entry impede entry into informal William J. Baumol, John C. Panzar and Robert D. Willig, Contestable Markets and
the Theory of Industry Structure (Harcourt Brace Jovanovich 1988).
2 R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J L & Econ 1 (1960).
3 See Andrew R. Dick, When Are CartelsStable Contracts?,39 J L & Econ 241 (1996).
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tion markets than impede markets in physical goods. Simultaneously, the geographic scope of the market has become global,
raising the question whether any one nation's antitrust law can
have much effect, other than to hobble domestic producers.
How much has the need for antitrust law declined? I'll venture the proposition that any practice in an information industry
that survives long enough to be challenged in court, and for the
court to reach a decision after a trial, must be efficient. If it were
otherwise, there would have been a swift market response. Entry
may be tardy, but courts are glacial. Thus we are doomed to a
world in which efficient practices are selected out for judicial review, and any error rate in adjudication-there is, alas, a substantial one-will lead to the inappropriate condemnation of proconsumer practices.
That's a capsule version of my views. A longer version comes
out much the same way. The problem with a longer version is
that judges can't talk about pending cases, such as the Microsoft
litigation that everyone here is eager to debate. Nor can I discuss
phone mergers, one of which is subject to a suit that I may have
to adjudicate,4 and many other of the juicy subjects of this Symposium. But I do think that a bit of background from the world of
telecommunications is useful to show how what we call the "Information Age" affects even large firms with substantial physical
assets, such as land lines, switches, and satellites that can't
readily be moved to different orbits (or changed, after launch, to
work with a different part of the spectrum).
Until the AT&T consent decree of 1982,' a giant firm dominated most aspects of the telecommunications business in the
United States, other than telegraph and telex services, which had
its own monopolist (Western Union). This structure was not a
market creation. Initially the work of the Bell patents, it was
later protected by governmental regulation. By the 1970s this
structure was under competitive pressure from MCI and other
4 See South Austin Coalition Community Council v SBC Communications Inc, 191
F3d 842 (7th Cir 1999).
5 United States v American Telephone & Telegraph Co, 552 F Supp 131, 226 (D DC
1982), affd as Maryland v United States, 460 US 1001 (1983). For a thorough description
of the decree, its background, and its implementation, see Michael K Kellogg, John
Thorne & Peter W. Huber, Federal Telecommunications Law (Little, Brown 1992). For a
discussion of the state of (and prospects for) competition in local telecommunications markets, see William J. Baumol & J. Gregory Sidak, Toward Competition in Local Telephony
(MIT 1994). (While serving in the Solicitor General's Office during the 1970s, I worked on
some aspects of the AT&T case, but my comments here do not reflect any information
gained during my brief association with the case.)
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long distance carriers, which had figured out how to evade some
of the regulatory barriers and provide long-distance service to
large customers who could bypass the local AT&T switches for
their internal traffic. The consent decree broke AT&T apart, into
a competitive long-lines segment and monopolistic local switches.
A fundamental assumption behind the reorganization was that
local phone service is a natural monopoly because average total
costs of both land lines and call switching decline through the
entire range of demand. Thus the Baby Bells were left as monopolies, with prices constrained by state public utilities commissions, while the national and international segments of the business became competitive.
But technology has not allowed this to endure. It is not clear
whether the local switch and local lines ever were natural monopolies, but they certainly aren't today. Communications now do
not necessarily depend on costly land lines. In Chicago there are
three local service carriers: one Baby Bell (which offers both land
lines and cellular) and two cellular carriers (one of which is
AT&T itself). Meanwhile three sets of satellites whirl overhead,
each capable of transmitting calls from handheld units to anywhere in the world, bypassing the local service providers. Two of
these are in bankruptcy reorganization-not something we would
expect if they were facing local service and cellular carriers
charging monopoly prices.' One company, Iridium, is in bankruptcy because the alternatives are so cheap that it can't make a
profit even disregardingthe sunk costs of the satellites! It can't
recover even the recurring costs of sales and service.
The local switching service also has changed. Formerly done
by expensive electromechanical solenoids and relays, switching
now is handled by computer. Many customers have found it economical to install private branch exchanges in order to bypass the
Baby Bells, something that would not be feasible if local switching still were a natural monopoly. Some private branch exchanges (PBXs) may have been responses to high prices set or
condoned by state regulators to produce cross-subsidies; these
PBXs were inefficient entries. But even after the subsidies were
whittled away and prices dropped, customers continued to install
private switches. The internet shows how local switches can be
bypassed; a packet-switching network now works alongside (and
6

Iridium LLC and ICO Global Communications are in bankruptcy reorganization;

Globalstar is financially healthy. See generally Datacomm Research Company, Satellites
in Cyberspace:Opportunitiesfor Internet-based Satellite Ventures (December 1999).
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in competition to) the circuit-switching network of traditional
phone companies.7
The regional phone companies have built a great deal of new
infrastructure, much of it optical fiber that can carry more traffic
than does copper; cable TV firms and internet service providers
likewise have installed high-capacity circuits, producing at least
potential competition between cable and phone companies to
supply the same services. At least three more methods are on the
horizon.8 Some new entrants offer fiber optic connections; others
offer broadband home-to-satellite links, similar to direct TV but
working both ways. The third new method is LMDS, which
stands for local multipoint distribution service. This offers a radio-frequency connection at a rate of roughly 19 megabytes per
second between a base station and a transceiver in a home or office. This is faster than 100 base-T Ethernet, carrying more than
a thousand times the data of a digital cell phone connection. Each
of these new technologies can have multiple providers in a single
metropolitan area. The premise of the Baumol approach seems
close to fulfillment in telecommunications.
To say that technological changes contract the field of opportunities for monopolization is not to say that none remain. Regulatory entry barriers exist, and these barriers may create opportunities for collusive conduct under what amounts to governmental protection. But antitrust litigation cannot undo statutes creating these barriers, so where should we direct judicial attention?
To cartels? There is nothing special about cartels in the information age-though I will suggest later that information creates some structures that can be confused with cartels, so that
the Supreme Court's warning in BroadcastMusic, Inc v CBS 9 to
be wary of treating horizontal price agreements as cartels remains important.
To mergers? Again there is nothing special here. The essential point was established long ago: with easy entry, big mergers
don't cause problems even if demand is inelastic. That leaves the
factual question whether entry is easy and the elasticity of supply
high. One suspects that the answer is "yes" for most information
products, unless the government throws barriers in the way, but
still there is nothing distinctive in the field.
7 See generally Lee W. McKnight & Joseph Bailey, eds, Internet Economics (MIT

1997).
8

David D. Clark, et al, High-Speed Data Races Home, 281 Scientific American 94-

115 (Oct 1999).
9 441 US 1, 16 (1979).
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Perhaps, then, we should direct our attention to exclusionary
practices-efforts by incumbents to reduce their rivals' elasticity
of supply, and thus to provide room for higher prices (if the aggressors can suppress competition among themselves). Most of
the litigation and administrative inquiry these days seems to
concern exclusionary practices. "Network externalities" is the
buzzphrase. This phrase does not have much history in antitrust,
which implies that the problems are novel and require special
scrutiny. But I don't think that the problems are novel. "Network
externalities" is a gussied-up phrase denoting old ideas such as
tie-ins, predatory pricing, and the like, that do not need amendment but do require good old-fashioned skepticism. What may
seem to be novel claims about networks (and thus about information) fall into three categories.
First, there is a question whether some element of the network is a bottleneck-perhaps because it is a natural monopoly
like the local telephone switches in 1982, or perhaps because the
bottleneck has been created artificially. Information flows most
freely if there is an agreed protocol, and these are many, from
standards such as the definition of HDTV and DVD to the rules
for instant messaging on the internet. Operating systems, instruction sets for CPUs, and many others can be characterized as
bottlenecks. If one or more of these standards turns out to be a
natural monopoly, then we must answer the usual question
whether public rate regulation is desirable. But it is hard to conceive of these as natural monopolies when we see competing
technologies flourish. I'll come back to this issue.
Second, there is a question whether it is possible to coordinate to avoid overcharges when two bottlenecks occur in the same
path. If, to take a wild example, a computer operating system is
tailored to a processor's instruction set, then the two will flourish
or fall together. They will face competition from systems that
span the range of processors (Linux at the moment), from unitary
enterprises (such as Sun Microsystems, which makes both hardware and software), and from other tied pairs (Apple and the
IBM-Motorola PowerPC coalition). But assume that one pair has
the lion's share. May they cooperate to avoid sequential monopoly
and, if so, how?
Third, there is a question whether firms can exploit, or will
be defeated by, complementarities. A computer is just a doorstop
unless it has useful software. A word processing program is
worthless without hardware. Both computer and word processor
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are more valuable if there are spreadsheets and modems and
formats such as Acrobat to transmit and display the information
they produce. An improvement in any one of these products affects the value, and hence the price, of others. By devising the
PDF format underlying Acrobat, Adobe conferred substantial external benefits on producers and users of complementary products. This implies that without coordination too little will be produced, the price will be too high, or both. Does antitrust allow
coordination? And of course to say that the answer is yes implies
that firms also may choose not to coordinate-that AOL may decide that it does not want to have a common instant message system with Yahoo, because it does not want to confer value on a
third party without being paid (or because it wants to keep a
unique feature for itself, the better to compete against Microsoft).
What I want to do is look at these three areas. Time is too
short to examine them in depth; whole papers and books could be
devoted to small aspects of each. Instead I want to say just
enough to sound a cautionary note. For each of these subjects is
in the field of exclusionary practices, and antitrust handles these
very poorly.1" They require predictions. Cartels reduce output and
raise price now, without offsetting efficiencies. Mergers to monopoly also reduce output now; and although they may produce
efficiencies, these lie in the future-and are generally ignored by
courts because judges sensibly think that they can't make reliable
determinations. But exclusionary practices as a rule reduce prices
today (predatory pricing and "free" tie-ins are vivid examples),
and may well produce efficiencies tomorrow. Exclusion also may
produce concentration and monopoly, depending on the ease of
entry in the future. It is always very risky to forego lower prices
and greater output today because of fears about tomorrow, fears
that may never come to pass because we misunderstand the practice (low prices may just reflect low costs) or because technology
changes the conditions tomorrow so that the excluders can't recoup. Cases such as Matsushita and Brooke Group warn about
the dangers of turning judges into prophets. 1
My agenda, then, is to look briefly at each of the three subjects that gets lumped into "network externalities" and ask
whether the legal process (agencies and courts together) is likely
10 See generally Frank H. Easterbrook, On Identifying Exclusionary Conduct, 61
Notre Dame L Rev 972 (1986).
11 See Brooke Group Ltd v Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp, 509 US 209, 220-27
(1993); Matsushita Electric Industrial Co, Ltd v Zenith Radio Corp, 475 US 574 (1986).
See also Cargill,Inc v Monfort of Colorado, Inc, 479 US 104 (1986).
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to be astute at separating pro-consumer from anti-consumer
practices. Then I will wrap up by asking whether the legal system
has ways to reduce the costs of error when evaluating novel practices.
First, let us think about bottleneck issues. The old story is
one of natural monopoly in the telephone switch, or of unnatural
monopoly via merger (as when Jay Gould bought the two bridges
and the ferry system in St. Louis and thus acquired a chokehold
over train traffic across the Mississippi River).12
The political response to real natural monopolies has been to
create common-carrier obligations, coupled with rate regulation.
George Stigler thought these steps ineffectual 3 or even perverse-the regulated firms used them to stifle new entry.
The antitrust response has been to create either joint ownership or a must-carry duty (for example, to "wheel" power or information over land lines). 4 Joint ownership, the approach taken
to the Mississippi River bottleneck and seats on the New York
Stock Exchange, proved to be monopoly fortified by law: the
bridge company made its monopoly profit, as did the stock exchange (until Congress finally busted that cartel in 1975). A duty
to "wheel" leaves the price term open, so it fails to handle monopoly unless the court becomes a rate regulator-and few think that
the isolated examples of judicial rate regulation, such as the
blanket license decree in New York, 5 or review of the Copyright
Royalty Tribunal, 6 have been sterling successes. The only other
apparent judicial solution is disestablishment-but that is a loser
if the reason for the bottleneck is either natural monopoly or efficiency, for then the cost savings are squandered.
If handling claims of bottlenecks is not something that antitrust has traditionally done well, it has done even worse when
the bottleneck concerns information and developing technology.
Do any of you remember the IBM case than ran from 1969 to
1982? The Antitrust Division's fundamental claim was that IBM
had become a monopolist in computing services, and that its plat12 United States v Terminal RailroadAssociation of St. Louis, 224 US 383 (1912); but
see Curtis M. Grimm, Clifford Winston & Carol A. Evans, Foreclosure of Railroad Markets: A Test of the ChicagoLeverage Theory, 35 J L & Econ 295 (1992).
13 See, for example, George J. Stigler & Clare Friedland, What Can Regulators Regulate? The Case of Electricity, 5 J L & Econ 1 (1962).
14 See, for example, Otter Tail Power Co v United States, 410 US 366 (1973).
15 I refer to the consent decree to which the performing rights societies are subject.
This decree is discussed by the Supreme Court's decision in BMI, 441 US at 10-16.
16 See 17 USC §§ 114-16, 119, 801-03 (1994).
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form was a bottleneck to vendors of complementary products,
such as disk drives. 7 The bottleneck was not only IBM's mainframe computers, but also the devices used to move information
in and out of them-devices (and protocols) called interfaces. A
central claim in both the government's suit and a cloud of private
litigation was that IBM monopolized the market for peripherals,
such as disk drives and printers, by continually changing its interfaces. Peripherals vendors no sooner figured out how to connect their disk drives to IBM's mainframes than IBM changed
the interface specification and made the vendors start all over
again. The supposed consequence was that IBM maintained a
huge share of both mainframes and peripherals. Plaintiffs sought
judicial decrees that would produce stability in the interface, so
that third-party vendors could keep up with IBM in selling peripherals. Suits lasted until it became clear that IBM mainframes
were no longer a large share of any interesting market; and of
course IBM's share was eroded by technological developments,
not legal rules.
But the claim of "interface predation" (today
it would be
called "raising rivals' costs" or "network externalities") never
identified a monopoly. What the Antitrust Division had wanted
the court to enjoin was progress. Newer protocols were faster or
had other benefits. Most of you observe the process with your own
computers. Five years ago computers came with RS-232c serial
and SCSI interfaces; some also came with older parallel connectors. The serial port could transfer data at a blazing 256 kilobits
per second. The SCSI interface, about 100 times faster, could
support up to 5 megabytes per second. Later generations of SCSI
have increased that speed by a factor of 16 (the fastest is called
Ultra Wide SCSI 2, in case you like technospeak). But SCSI operates at the rate of the slowest connected peripheral, requires each
to have an ID, is limited to 7 devices, and often encounters problems with termination. Newer machines are likely to come with
USB (universal serial bus) and 1394 (FireWire) connectors. The
USB is slower, at 1.5 megabytes per second, while FireWire goes
now to 60 megabytes per second. Both allow longer chains and
cheaper cables than their predecessors; both avoid device IDs and
termination. FireWire provides some power to attachments, so

17

See generally Franklin M. Fisher, John J. McGowan & Joen E. Greenwood, Folded,

Spindled, and Mutilated: Economic Analysis and U.S. v. IBM (MIT 1983). Fisher was
IBM's principal economic expert, and the book reflects that perspective, but the book still
has the best story of the case and the industry during the 1960s and 1970s.
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many peripherals can omit plugs and power bricks. Improvements to both protocols are in the works; almost before the installed base of first generation devices becomes substantial,
faster versions of each are in prospect. Such restless change is
exactly what IBM was accused of; that competitive markets are
revising interfaces even faster than the bad old "monopolist"
shows the danger of believing that we can identify exclusionary
practices. IBM's problem may have been that it did not change
fast enough and thus could not keep up with the competition!
By the way, these new interfaces also show that cooperation
may facilitate competition. The SCSI, USB, and FireWire protocols were developed by industry consortiums-standard-setting
organizations that don't use their position to exclude competition,
but have to struggle to stay ahead of a tsunami that always
threatens to overtake them.
One other story about the ability of antitrust to identify bottleneck monopolies in information technologies. I know of only
one case in which such a monopoly has finally been identified in
litigation. 8 The offender was an operating system, which the
court concluded was a monopoly. No one software or hardware
manufacturer could compete, the court held, without access to
that operating system, which the owner therefore had to open to
general use without regard to its copyrights and contracts. And
who is that vicious monopolist that bestrides the information
age? Why, it is the Data General Corporation, and the bottleneck
monopoly operating system is DG's RDOS, an operating system
for the Nova chip that DG included in a line of mini-computers!
Yes, you heard me right. The court of appeals was confident that
nova chips were a separate market, that DG was a monopolist,
and that it therefore had to license its operating system for use
on chips made by Fairchild Instruments. I must confess bias because I was involved in that case as a lawyer, but this seemed
fantastic to me even in 1984, when the decision was made. If
anyone had market power in mini-computers, it was DEC, not
DG. But from the perspective of hindsight the court's decision
seems merely quaint. DG soon went into bankruptcy; the segment of the market in which both DG and DEC competed was
overtaken by workstations such as those now made by Sun, if it
ever was a distinct segment. Perhaps the court's decision contributed to that demise; perhaps the demise was inevitable. Confident conclusions about who is a monopolist, and what is a bottle18 Digidyne Corp v Data General Corp, 734 F2d 1336 (9th Cir 1984).
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neck in operating systems, were converted to a source of humor in
a few years. As Santayana observed, those who fail to learn from
the past are condemned to repeat it. We need to learn from IBM
and DG just how acute are the legal system's senses in detecting
technological monopolies.
Let me come now to the second subject, the question whether
owners of intellectual property may coordinate their activities to
avoid monopoly overcharges (and perhaps for other reasons, such
as improving that intellectual property). Suppose that nova chips
and RDOS were indeed monopolies, as the court of appeals held,
but that they were owned by separate firms. A single monopolist
wants to set MC = MR, to maximize its profit. If nova chips are
sold to a manufacturer who buys a copy of RDOS to produce a
computer, there is a problem. The maker of chips tries to set price
so that MC = MR, to engross all of the monopoly profit; the owner
of RDOS tries to do the same thing; but this double monopoly
profit means that the product sold to the consumer will be above
the profit-maximizing price. There will be two welfare loss triangles. Society would be better off if the firms merged, or if they
agreed with each other to lower their prices (maybe even down to
something like the competitive level, just in case the Nova-RDOS
pair turns out not to be a monopoly at all).
As I understand the draft joint venture guidelines from the
Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission, 9 either the merger or the agreement would be looked at with grave
suspicion, indeed might be condemned as illegal per se, because
the merger or agreement would not be essential to produce a
computer with a Nova chip and RDOS operating system. If a firm
starts out creating everything internally-if Apple comes up with
the Macintosh hardware and the Macintosh Operating System all
by itself, and tailors them to work with Motorola chips-that is
lawful because there is no merger or joint venture. But if it is
necessary to make adjustments in the market ex post, then we
are staring at a monopoly. The guidelines imply that maybe, just
maybe, the antitrust enforcers would listen to claims of efficiency.
But we know that they are very hard to evaluate in the abstract.
Let me give you another case from my own experience, this time
as a judge.

19 DOJ and Federal Trade Commission, Request for Views on Draft Antitrust Guidelines for CollaborationsAmong Competitors, 64 Fed Reg 54484 (1999).
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Fishman v Estate of Wirtz2° arose out of a fight to buy the
Chicago Bulls. You may have heard of them. They are a pro basketball team. But at the time, in 1972, Michael Jordan was in
third grade, and the price for the team lock stock and barrel was
$3.3 million, which these days will get you one year's play from a
third-string center. In the 1970s the Bulls played their games in
the Chicago Stadium, the largest arena in Chicago. The owners of
the Stadium wanted to acquire the Bulls, converting a tenancy to
a vertically integrated firm. They persuaded the NBA to turn
down a bid by a rival group and so grabbed the brass ring. The
plaintiffs, the rival bidders, treated this as exclusionary conduct
by an "essential facility"-the Stadium-which had not played
fair and had converted its monopoly of arenas into a double monopoly. An alternative view is that both Stadium and Bulls were
"natural monopolies"--that Chicago could not support more than
one pro basketball team and jumbo stadium-and therefore ought
to be merged. Owned separately, each would try to engross the
profit in the basketball business, the Stadium through monopoly
rents and the Bulls through monopoly ticket and TV prices; such
"sequential monopolies" injure consumers even more than singlestage monopolies do, and the injury could be alleviated by
merger."'
How could a court decide between these competing hypotheses? It might accept the logic of one or the other, but if it tried to
measure the facts of the case against economic theory it would
come up short. The parties had not gathered data about how the
merger in 1972 affected ticket prices, gate, TV and radio audience, and other elements of price and output. If they had the data
in hand, what could they have done with them to settle the antitrust question? Changes in the quality of the product dominate
the effects of a sequential monopoly. A winning team will generate more revenues without any implication of monopoly. Changes
in the popularity of basketball compared with other sports (such
as hockey or indoor soccer) also would confound attempts to draw
inferences from the data. This is not to say it can't be done, but
that the inferences drawn from the attempt will be open to debate. Economic study of a single case, even long after the fact (the
parties had fourteen years before the final decision), cannot de807 F2d 520 (7th Cir 1986).
See Roger D. Blair & David L. Kaserman, Law and Economics of Vertical Integration and Control 31-36 (Academic 1983); Frederick R. Warren-Boulton, Vertical Controlof
Markets 51-63, 80-82 nn 1-9 (Ballinger 1978). Contrast the majority opinion in Fishman,
807 F2d at 537 n 15, with the dissent, id at 563-64.
20
21
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finitively answer questions concerning efficiency and consumers'
welfare. In this case later developments were uninformative. The
Stadium was torn down, and the United Center built, but this
tells us little about whether either the stadium or team had monopoly power. There has been more litigation about the Bulls,
who in the 1990s claimed that the NBA was abusing its market
power by curtailing teams' access to national TV. That case, too,
ended without definitive resolution.22 Our inability to resolve
complex questions of this kind should give pause for an approach
that proposes either instant condemnation or an anything-goes
inquiry, as the Joint Venture Guidelines do.
Now for a few words about the third flavor of "network externalities"--complementarities among products. This too is an old
subject. Think of shopping centers as shopping networks. The
presence of a classy department store in a mall makes the fast
food outlets more valuable; lots of parking makes all the stores
more attractive; and so on. Some coordination is essential if the
mall is to appear at all; individual stores would not find it worthwhile to open unless assured of the others' presence. The fast food
operator may be inclined to engross some of the profit by raising
its own prices; this makes the mall less attractive to consumers
and department stores. Cooperation to deal with the issue is apt
to be called a lawful ancillary restraint, even if it deals with price
and output."
What happens when the subject is more esoteric-when instead of a mall we have a computer system or web gateway and
instead of stores we have software or peripherals? I think that
the problem is the same. Just as Apple can coordinate by doing
more internally, it should be okay for AOL to strike a deal with
authors of chat software about price and usage, and for groups of
manufacturers to agree on specifics of, say, the FireWire protocol,
that affects the price or availability of hardware and software
that works with it. Otherwise external effects are being missed,
and either prices will be too high or entry will be retarded.
Douglas Lichtman made this point recently in an interesting
piece on coordination in emerging platform technologies.2 4 But

22 See Chicago Professional Sports Limited Partnership v National Basketball Association, 95 F3d 593 (7th Cir 1996); Chicago Professional Sports Limited Partnership v
National BasketballAssociation, 961 F2d 667 (7th Cir 1992).
23 Polk Brothers, Inc v ForestCity Enterprises,Inc, 776 F2d 185 (7th Cir 1985).
24 See Douglas G. Lichtman, Property Rights in Emerging Platform Technologies, 29 J
Legal Stud 615 (June 2000). But see Dennis W. Carlton & Michael Waldman, The Strate-
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again the Guidelines may not see things this way; they evince a
tendency to say that anything smacking of price or access regulation is a per se offense. That fails to learn the lesson of CBS v
BMI, which recognized that the blanket license to copyrighted
songs can improve consumers' welfare, even though the authors
coordinate nothing except their price. Just so, one would think,
with other forms of intellectual property.
Enforcement agencies tend to see cooperation that does not
produce a "new product" either as a cartel or as a means of raising rivals' costs. They tend to think that all exclusion is bad. Let
me ask once again whether antitrust has a history of success in
evaluating such arguments about exclusionary practices. Because
I'm trying to avoid comments about ongoing cases, I'll use two
examples of older networks-a skiing network in Aspen, "5 and the
network of service providers in a hospital.
The larger of two firms in the ski business in Aspen, Colorado, refused to cooperate with its rival in offering joint lift tickets. The firms had offered joint tickets for many years, charging a
single price and allowing use of lifts on any mountain for zero
marginal price. How were revenues from the joint tickets to be
divided? The parties came to loggerheads about this, and the
larger firm then withdrew from the joint venture.
Perhaps this raised its rival's costs of doing business, allowing the larger firm to raise its own prices (if Aspen is a market).
This is equivalent to booting someone off of a software "platform"
for not cooperating with respect to prices or specifications. Perhaps, however, this prevented its rival from taking a free ride on
customers lured to Aspen by the larger firm's services and ads.
No one has offered an attractive way to organize observations
about such conduct, and _the parties did not collect the data
needed to test conflicting hypotheses about the conduct. Long after the litigation ended, we cannot reject the possibility that the
joint ticket was a cartel price, and that by withdrawing the larger
firm had at last restored competition.
Aspen is the rule, not the exception. Try to think of any subject in the domain of antitrust-other than cartels and mergers to
monopoly-in which you are confident that the decision of a lawyer-judge and six jurors with high school educations, guided by
the economic analysis of two lawyers and some economic witgic Use of Tying to Preserve and Create Market Power in Evolving Industries (Working
Paper No 145, Stigler Center for the Study of the Economy and the State, Sept 1998).
25 Aspen Skiing Corp v Aspen HighlandsSkiing Corp, 472 US 585 (1985).
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nesses, will systematically beat the market in coming up with
"good" results. Where are the triumphs of the judicial process in
preceding the economic profession to an understanding of the effects of business practices? Consider this: every scholar working
in antitrust and industrial organization believes that a majority
of other scholars do not understand-even hold perverse views
on-the topics about which he knows the most. I need not draw
out implications for the ability of generalist judges to give correct
answers to knotty questions arising out of novel business practices.
The hospital "network" led to Jefferson Parish Hospital District No 2 v Hyde,2" a tie-in case. A hospital granted to a group of
anesthesiologists the exclusive right to that medical specialty
within its walls. An anesthesiologist based at another hospital
sued, contending that this contract monopolized by tying anesthesia to such services as recovery rooms and bedpans. Here the
hospital is like an operating system or protocol that has granted
preferred access to some other complementary piece of software.
Hyde, the plaintiff, contended that he could furnish better anesthesia to his patients more cheaply than the hospital's group
could. The hospital replied that the exclusive contract eliminated
free riding on the emergency, training, and supervisory services
of the resident group (which furnished anesthesia 24 hours a day
and ran the hospital's department, including making the choice
between physicians and nurse-anesthetists as providers of services). If there was market power vis-A-vis patients, the hospital
said, it possessed that power and had no reason to cede profits to
the resident anesthesiologists but would instead buy those services as cheaply as it could (per unit of quality).
The dispute between the parties about the consequences of
the practice may have been important to the Court's decision to
moderate the per se rule that it formerly applied to tie-ins. After
Hyde the plaintiff must establish market power in the tying and
tied products and must show "forcing," which seems to require
inquiry into whether informed consumers would approve of the
practice-which they would if it is efficient. Yet how can a court
tell? One cannot measure "efficiency" with a barometer. The tale
of monopoly implies that hospitals with exclusive contracts for
anesthesiology (and other services such as radiology and pathology) charge higher prices for these services than those who do
not. The defendants' reply that the exclusion is efficient does not
26

466 US 2 (1984).
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necessarily imply lower prices (efficiency could lie in higher quality for the same price), and anyway what price serves as the
benchmark? It would be hard to address the question without
nationwide data on the market shares and exclusive contracts of
hospitals, plus the price and effectiveness of anesthesiology at
each. These are hard to come by-the duration of the litigation in
Hyde was not nearly long enough, and some of the information
(such as the quality of services rendered) is not available.
Hyde reached the Supreme Court long before data had been
assembled. Three years after the Court's decision, the first useful
information was published, by an economist who got a head start
as a consulting expert in the case.27 William Lynk obtained data
on market shares and hospitals' use of exclusive contracts, but
not on price or quality, and formulated hypotheses to tease answers from these limited data. He reasoned that if exclusive contracts create or exploit market power, they should be used more
often as concentration in the market increases; if they increase
efficiency in production, there should be no relation with market
concentration, but larger hospitals (holding aggregate concentration constant) would be more likely to use exclusives, because
hospitals using efficient methods of production would grow relative to others. The data Lynk assembled show that exclusives are
somewhat less likely to be used as market concentration increases, but, holding concentration constant, are somewhat more
likely to be used in the larger hospitals. Lynk concluded that
these data refute the monopoly hypothesis, without necessarily
confirming the efficiency (or any particular) hypothesis. So some
years after Hyde, the economics profession took a step toward
understanding the phenomenon, but too late to help in the litigation and still too uncertain to be a firm basis for deciding tomorrow's cases.
Well, you may ask, can antitrust enforcers and courts ever
get things right? Surely yes, but it is not clear that they will do so
at a rate much higher than random, or at costs lower than the
allocative loss of the processes sought to be suppressed. I am no
fan of consider-everything cases such as California Dental,"
which told the FTC and the court of appeals to consider "more" in
dealing with restrictions on advertising. The Court said that such
27

William J. Lynk & Michael A. Morrisey, The Economic Basis of Hyde: Are Market

Power and Hospital Exclusive Contracts Related?, 30 J L & Econ 399 (1987). See also
William J. Lynk, Physician Price Fixing Under the Sherman Act, 7 J Health Econ 95
(1988).
28 CaliforniaDentalAssociation v FTC, 526 US 756, 769-81 (1999).
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restrictions might be beneficial-but this does not seem likely,
and pursuit of wills-o'-the wisp produces high litigation and high
error costs. (CaliforniaDental is also indicative that at least a
majority of the Justices thinks that we don't know enough to deal
confidently with even simple agreements about information.) Professor Hovenkamp believes that California Dental overturns
Topco,29 and I'm sure this is right; agreements about information
(including territories to advertise) now require analysis, and getting rid of Topco reduces false positives. But it also causes a miasma in which uncertainty and litigation costs go through the
roof.
Back to the costs of false positives-that is, the condemnation
of efficient conduct, coupled with the in terrorem effect of inducing firms to avoid such conduct, lest costly litigation and remedies ensue. If as I suggested at the outset most practices that
survive long enough to be the subject of full-fledged litigation are
apt to be efficient, then many of the ultimate decisions will reflect
false positives.
What is to be done? Let me make a few suggestions for your
consideration.
First, we should use more widely the method we apply to cartels: per se rules based on ordinary effects, disdaining the search
for the rare counterexamples. Ditch all attempts to domesticate a
novel practice through the tools of litigation; redouble efforts to
understand the category of similar practices of which the case is
an example, and to devise a simple rule for adjudicating claims
concerning the category. Decide whether the category is allowed
or not at the level of rules, not of cases.
In other words, we must jettison the "never" fallacy. Judges
and scholars often say that unless a practice is "never" inefficient,
"never" costly to consumers, juries must determine whether it
was deleterious in the case at hand." Would anyone take such an
approach seriously in a cartel case? Should we say that unless
cartels are "never" efficient, we must rummage through the facts
case by case to determine the consequences of every price-fixing
arrangement? Not on your tintype. Courts started applying per se
rules to cartels and other practices early in the history of anti29

Herbert Hovenkamp, Competitor CollaborationAfter CaliforniaDental, 2000 U Chi

Legal F 149.
30 See, for example, Herbert Hovenkamp, Fact, Value and Theory in Antitrust Adjudication, 1987 Duke L J 897; Eleanor M. Fox & Lawrence A. Sullivan, Antitrust-Retrospective and Prospective: Where Are We Coming From? Where Are We Going?, 62 NYU L Rev
936 (1987).

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM

[2000:

trust. These rules are based on probabilities over the run of cases,
on the belief that a category of practices is so likely to be undesirable that it is not worth the costs (litigation, uncertainty, and
error) of sifting through instances to separate beneficent from
baleful. Even proof that a practice saves consumers "millions of
dollars" every year does not justify case-by-case inquiry, once the
practice is located in a group deemed likely to be harmful.3 ' If this
is the right way to deal with cartels, it is the right way to deal
with other practices. Society can't endure an antitrust law in
which "Heads the plaintiff wins, tails it's a jury question."
Per se rules conserve on information and on the costs of litigation. They hold down the sum of excusing conduct that is harmful, condemning conduct that is beneficial, and inducing firms to
steer clear of potentially beneficial practices that create risks of
condemnation (or costly litigation). We apply per se rules of illegality to cartels and mergers to monopoly. We apply per se rules
of legality in fact if not in name to the introduction of new products (although that may destroy desirable substitutes), to the redesign of old products (same potential effects), to price competition (provided price exceeds cost of manufacture), to charging
what the traffic will bear (although that may extract monopoly
profits), to expanding capacity (even though new plants may discourage entry), and to non-price vertical restraints. All of this we
do on a categorical basis, for to examine the practice at hand in
any detail is to abandon per se treatment.
Second, we should make greater use of market power as a
threshold requirement.3 The draft Joint Venture Guidelines
grant safe harbor when the cooperating firms have less than 20
percent of the market, or there are four rivals (including the joint
venture). The "rule of four" makes a good deal of sense. Students
31 Arizona v Maricopa County Medical Society, 457 US 332, 342 (1982). See also FTC
v Superior Court Trial Lawyers Association, 493 US 411 (1990). It is not clear whether
Maricopa survived State Oil Co v Khan, 522 US 3 (1997), but this is yet another source of
uncertainty.
32 The alternative is a "trade policy" directed almost exclusively by the executive
branch of the national government, the norm in the rest of the world.
3 See generally Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits ofAntitrust, 63 Tex L Rev 1 (1984).
I do not pursue the question how to define market power, an independent debate. For
current purposes I accept the caution of Thomas G. Krattenmaker, Robert H. Lande &
Steven C. Salop, Monopoly Power and Market Power in Antitrust Law, 76 Geo L J 241
(1987), that market power consists in either the ability to cut output in the market (significantly) by reducing one's own output, or the ability to cut market output (significantly)
by diminishing one's rivals' output (equivalently, by diminishing rivals' elasticity of supply). The power to diminish a rival's production is not market power, though, unless other
rivals are unable to fill the gap.
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of industrial organization often say that there are only four interesting numbers: one, two, three, and every other number. Three
appears to be the maximum number of firms that can coordinate
a cartel; after that, competition busts out. So four effective rivals
ought to make us forget our worries.
But the Guidelines limit this to joint ventures that create
new products and say that the principle does not apply to "naked"
agreements or to price agreements; these, the enforcers insist, are
illegal per se. I think that this is a mistake. If a given firm or set
of firms lacks market power, why apply a per se rule? If market
power is missing, and thus monopoly prices are not possible, then
you must confront the possibility that the arrangement creates
real efficiencies, even if the antitrust enforcers can't understand
them (and the proponents can't prove their existence). Courts are
beginning to iptroduce a market power threshold into the domain
of per se rules. 4 That's what happened in Hyde for tie-ins,
Northwest Stationery for boycotts, and State Oil for one variety of
resale price maintenance.35 When firms without market power
employ devices that cannot injure consumers by creating monopoly prices, their conduct may well be beneficial-and if there are
no benefits, the conduct will die out without the need for judicial
condemnation. Courts won't be able to see the benefits in many
cases, but they will be there just the same. Treating the lack of
market power as a trap door out of antitrust law not only saves
parties and courts the costs of inquiry but also dramatically reduces the likelihood of mistaken condemnation of beneficial practices.
A firm without market power could of course injure the plaintiff, perhaps in ways we do not want to approve. The McCoys can
injure the Hatfields by opening a rival shop next door, wounding
their enemies without injuring consumers in the slightest; so too
the Hatfields can shoot the McCoys without possessing market
power. Sponsors of yet another flavor of DVD can injure both
their rivals and themselves by selling products that can cannibalize other firms' sales, ensuring that neither will be able to obtain the economies of scale necessary to produce efficiently. Per3' NCAA v Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma, 468 US 85 (1984), asked a
market power question in a suit attacking a horizontal agreement. Jefferson ParishHospital DistrictNo 2 v Hyde, 466 US 2 (1984), holds that market power is the first question in
every tie-in case even though a per se analysis may be used after power has been demonstrated. Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc v Pacific Stationery & PrintingCo, 472 US
284, 296 (1985), adds a market power hurdle to the law of boycotts.
35 Hyde, 466 US 2; Northwest Wholesale Stationers,472 US 284; State Oil, 522 US 3.
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haps that will be the fate of Sony's "super audio DVD" and its
rivals. But injuries of this kind we ignore, just as antitrust ignores the injuries created by murder, because there is nothing
distinctive about them. It would be folly to start drawing demand
curves to decide whether murder should be unlawful. To say that
the lack of market power is a trap door out of antitrust is not to
say that it is a trap door out of the legal system.
Antitrust is a complex body of law requiring exceedingly expensive tools, with great potential to injure the economy by misunderstanding and condemning complex practices. Legal problems that would not benefit from the application of these tools
should be addressed by bodies of law that are more streamlined,
such as contract. If no monopoly overcharge looms, that should be
enough of an indicator that some other fount of law is appropriate.36
To say that a market share too small to support an overcharge is no worry of antitrust sets the stage for the question:
what happens if the plan succeeds and the product or method
grows until it possesses market power? Does the shield drop
away, and do we now condemn what we formerly encouraged?
This is not just a potential problem under Learned Hand's maxim
from Alcoa that the law should not turn on the winners.3 7 The
very fact that a platform or technology wins may demonstrate
that it has net benefits for consumers and must not be disestablished, despite its large share. What is more, or perhaps what is
confounding, is that even if the large share is accompanied by
some market power and monopoly profits, this may be the reward
for the new technology. This is clear enough for a patent owned
by a single firm. Most patents have low or no rewards; a very few
have huge rewards, and the desire to be such a big winner drives
the process of innovation.3 8 You can't turn on the winner and take
away the profits without destroying the incentive to innovate in
the first place.
36

FTC v Superior Court Trial Lawyers Association, 493 US at 432-36 , rejects the

invitation to search for market power in standard cartel cases. Atlantic Richfield Co v
USA Petroleum Co, 495 US 328, 334-35 (1990), adds that even if the defendants' conduct
is price fixing illegal per se, a private plaintiff may recover only if it establishes that it
paid higher prices as a result of a monopoly overcharge (or was a victim of predatory
pricing); such a demonstration will be impossible in the absence of market power. The net
effect is that market power is a threshold requirement in private litigation but not in suits
led by the federal government. (States are treated as "private" antitrust plaintiffs, see
Californiav American Stores Co, 495 US 271 (1990)).
37 United States v Aluminum Co ofAmerica, 377 US 271 (1964).
38 F.M. Scherer, The Innovation Lottery (working paper 1998).
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What this leads to is my third proposal: that we not worry
about winners-at least, not while they are winners. When a
firm's or group's market share is growing, they can't be restricting output and causing problems for consumers. Only when the
share starts to shrink is there reason to worry that output is being curtailed. And even when the share starts to shrink, if the
market output continues to rise, there is little cause for concern.
This is a variant of a proposal that William Landes and I
have long advocated for predatory pricing cases-indeed, for exclusionary practices cases as a whole. The proposal is to do nothing during the period of supposed predation or exclusion.3 9 Wait
and see. If we see a low price or novel practice, there are three
hypotheses: efficiency, raising rivals' costs, and error. A firm that
makes an error is penalized by the market. A firm that builds a
better mousetrap or figures out how to cut costs should not be
penalized. Only real exclusion is worrisome. But the only reliable
way to differentiate exclusion from efficiency is to see what happens. Exclusion implies a period of aggression or clever tactics,
followed by a period of recoupment. If you don't see recoupment,
then you had efficiency (or error). Wait until the recoupment period to find out. Then collect damages so large that the project is
sure to be negative present value at the outset. Threaten to take
away the profits from the recoupment period, and people won't
engage in exclusionary behavior at the outset.
Matsushita" and Brooke Group4 essentially adopt this approach for predatory pricing, and it should be extended to other
claims of exclusionary practices. I anticipate the response that
agencies and courts will have a devil of a time determining
whether the recoupment period has arrived. I cheerfully concede
this point. But consider the consequences. If we think that we
can't identify a monopolistic practice even during the recoupment
period, when prices are elevated and output is being curtailed,
then what chance do we have of knowing ex ante whether a given
practice is efficient or exclusionary? We will have more information about that issue in five years; and if, by hypothesis, we won't
be able to make a good decision then, we most assuredly won't be
able to make a good decision now. Better to withdraw and avoid
false positives.
39 Frank H. Easterbrook, PredatoryStrategies and Counterstrategies,48 U Chi L Rev
263, 331-33 (1981).
40 Matsushita Electric Industrial Corporation, Ltd v Zenith Radio Corporation,475

US 574 (1986).
41 Brooke Group v Brown & Williamson Corporation,509 US 209 (1993).
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Fourth, and finally, we need to think about false positives in
devising remedies. Markets deal differently with false positives
and false negatives. Suppose the legal process errs and fails to
condemn an inefficient, exclusionary practice. That's a false negative. But there will be large private profits to be made by breaking the monopoly and offering consumers an alternative. False
negatives thus are self-correcting. Correction may take time, but
it occurs-and, as I have stressed, the characteristic of the information age is that things happen faster than they used to, so correction takes less time.
False positives, however, come with the force of law. The
court rearranges the market. Anyone who tries to put it back together again in pursuit of profit will be packed off to jail.
The best response is to define the prohibited acts as narrowly
as can be. If a given platform is deemed a bottleneck monopoly,
define only the core elements of the platform as the bottleneck
and allow variations. The court in Data General could have, say,
put RDOS as it existed in 1982 in the public domain, while allowing Fairchild, Data General, and all other comers to make
proprietary changes. Then we would find out if there was a real
problem with Data General's exclusion of others, or if instead
customers benefited from Data General's value added. The 1982
consent decree in telecommunications essentially took this approach-only the local switch was treated as a natural monopoly,
and people who made improvements to bypass or replicate the
switch were allowed to do so.
Antitrust is today a body of common law, always in evolution,
subject to different interpretation in thirteen federal circuits and
the courts of fifty states. A single practice may be challenged in a
dozen forums, by private plaintiffs and state attorneys general,
each convinced that litigation advances the nation's welfare. No
matter how well-intentioned the plaintiffs, no matter how astute
the judges, the process of common-law litigation is one of uncertainty. Until the last case is over, no one knows whether the practice can survive-indeed, no one knows whether its practitioners
can survive (given the prospect of stupendous damages). Common-law antitrust litigation is high-risk litigation, high-delay
litigation. By the time the other shoe drops, the moment for this
generation of products is past. That problem is especially acute
for information markets. Antitrust must recognize this and adjust. There is no other option.

